Sellers on the street: the human infrastructure of the mobile phone network in Kigali, Rwanda by Mann, L.E. & Nzayisenga, E.
This article was downloaded by: [Universiteit Leiden / LUMC]
On: 24 March 2015, At: 03:29
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Click for updates
Critical African Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcaf20
Sellers on the street: the human
infrastructure of the mobile phone
network in Kigali, Rwanda
Laura Manna & Elie Nzayisengab
a African Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden, The
Netherlands
b PSF-ICT Chamber, JICA, Kigali, Rwanda
Published online: 04 Dec 2014.
To cite this article: Laura Mann & Elie Nzayisenga (2015) Sellers on the street: the human
infrastructure of the mobile phone network in Kigali, Rwanda, Critical African Studies, 7:1, 26-46,
DOI: 10.1080/21681392.2015.974136
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2015.974136
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
it L
eid
en
 / L
UM
C]
 at
 03
:29
 24
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
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in Kigali, Rwanda
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(Received 9 September 2013; accepted 18 September 2014)
This paper looks in detail at the social and economic background of mobile airtime sellers on
the streets of Kigali. While informal networks have proved to be an invaluable resource for
large multinational telecommunication companies seeking to penetrate African markets,
changing technological capabilities may soon displace them. As Rwanda develops its
Internet and payment systems, companies and institutions hope to provide airtime and
services directly. The paper draws on interviews with airtime sellers in three
neighbourhoods of Kigali to ask what this temporary source of employment has done to
their long-term career prospects. While the Rwandan government information and
communication technology (ICT) strategy has hereto focused on high-end ICT and business
process outsourcing, this paper uses the experiences of airtime sellers to advocate for a more
bottom-up approach to entrepreneurship and economic development in Rwanda. We stress
that planners and researchers need to think more critically about value chains at the bottom
of the pyramid, not just in terms of how informal networks can be used as temporary
appendages to further the reach of formal multinational corporations, but how these new
kinds of chains and networks can be re-engineered to provide permanent and sustainable
livelihoods to workers and business owners at the base of the economy.
Keywords: labour; Rwanda; ICT; outsourcing; developmental state
Introduction
In 2001, Frederick Cooper wrote: ‘Africa is ﬁlled with areas where international investors do not
go, even when there are minerals that would repay investor’s efforts. To get to such places
requires not deregulation, but institutions and networks capable of getting there’ (Cooper
2001, 207). This paper examines the institutions and networks that have allowed multinational
telecommunication companies to access Rwanda’s markets. In contrast with the older patterns
of capital investment such as mining, agriculture or manufacturing, telecommunication requires
both heavy infrastructural investment and the uptake of that infrastructure by the population. Thus
unlike former patterns of enclave growth, telecommunication development requires making
people customers and making territories ‘legible’ markets (Scott 1998; Ferguson 2005).
In Rwanda, telecommunications development has incorporated both institution-building and
informal labour. Through its various arms, the Government of Rwanda (henceforth, GoR) has
intervened to attract multinational companies into the country to build a foundation for an
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information and communication technology (ICT)-enabled knowledge-based economy. It has
done so through building and managing physical infrastructure, ﬁnancing the entrance of multi-
national companies, buying bulk bandwidth capacity from international providers and re-engin-
eering the physical and political environment to make it more attractive to foreign investment. At
the same time, the GoR has allowed multinational companies to use informal labour to penetrate
the market, creating ﬂeeting opportunities for work and capital accumulation at the bottom of the
pyramid (BOP). The sanctioned use of informal labour by such corporations stands in sharp con-
trast with the treatment of independent street hawkers and other informal groups who are forbid-
den from engaging in commercial activities. While the GoR emphasizes entrepreneurship as a
plank in its development programmes and discourse, strategy currently stipulates that entrepre-
neurship must ﬁt within the strategies and interests of government and large-scale business.
With the growing awareness of the developmental potential of ‘big data’, coupled with the
desire by telecommunication companies to shift towards enhanced customer service, African tel-
ecommunications sectors are gravitating towards a more disintermediated form of airtime distri-
bution. This shift towards ‘big data’ is desirable for companies wishing to extend services but it is
also strategic for young ICT entrepreneurs seeking to monetize applications and for governments
wishing to target citizens for security, surveillance and taxation purposes. Thus while unregulated
sellers helped telecommunication companies to achieve their rapid rates of penetration at the
dawn of mobile telecommunications, they may not be so suitable for the next stage in its devel-
opment. Some companies have already begun the transition away from network expansion
towards enhanced customer service and data services. In Rwanda, this transition was described
in interviews with a range of companies, including the large telecoms, MTN, Tigo and Airtel
and by managers of local start-ups, such as SMS Media, Cyuda, Pivot Access and Vantage
Technologies.
While the sellers themselves may not know it, a change is coming and they may soon need to
ﬁnd other types of employment. This paper focuses on that trajectory, sharing the results of a street
survey conducted with 27 airtime sellers on the streets of Kigali in the summer of 2012. We ﬁrst
document the gains accrued by the individuals involved and then go on to query whether these
gains will have lasting effects on social mobility.
Section one situates the position of airtime sellers within a broader understanding of the
GoR’s economic strategy in relation to ICTs. As the GoR seeks to attract international investment
and transform the country into an ICT hub, it must increase the penetration of the telecommuni-
cations network, both through infrastructure and through the consumption of ICTs by ordinary
Rwandans. In this regard, informally contracted airtime sellers have played a pivotal role, along-
side massive government efforts to build infrastructure and create favourable formal institutions
for investment and growth.
Section two moves on to describe the social and economic background of the street sellers
interviewed by the authors. It reveals their relatively high earnings, their higher use of ICTs
and their more active participation in saving schemes as compared to the wider Rwandan popu-
lation. In short, informalized airtime distribution has provided real short-term beneﬁts to those
involved.
Section three describes respondents’ plans for the future. In contrast to other studies of poor
youth in Rwanda (Sommers 2012), airtime sellers are overwhelmingly positive about their
futures. At the same time, most seemed unaware of shifting company and government strategies
away from informal distribution networks towards digital distribution. In this ﬁnal Section, we
describe the tensions between the GoR’s top-down economic development plans and the econ-
omic realities faced by ordinary Rwandans.
The GoR’s style of development has been characterized by others (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2012; Kelsall 2013) as a ‘developmental patrimonial state’ model, with a highly
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disciplined technocracy implementing a state-led economic transformation in collaboration with
party-statals and foreign capital. However useful this analysis is for understanding political com-
mitment to development, it ignores how such large-scale investment (both multinational and dom-
estic) affects ordinary Rwandans and informal economic livelihoods on the ground. As scholars
like Purdekova (2011, 2012) have shown, this model has often involved heavy-handed social
engineering at the level of everyday Rwandan society. In order to transform the economic land-
scape, the GoR has stepped up control over informal economic activities (Rollason 2013) and has
attempted to re-orient the political imaginations of ordinary Rwandans away from the dangerous
rhetoric of political tribalism that underscored the genocide to new ideas about entrepreneurship
and self-sufﬁciency (Mann and Berry 2014). However as we will show, Rwandans are supposed
to become entrepreneurs but not in ways that might imperil the wider strategy of attracting foreign
investment.
Rwandan government strategy for enabling ICT-led growth has hereto focused on high-end
software and application development and on business process outsourcing (BPO). It seems
unclear how low-income and formally less educated people like the men and women surveyed
in this paper are to be included. In this sense, the paper urges Rwandan policy-makers to more
actively engage with ordinary citizens in their developmental plans.
This work is based on collaborative research conducted by researchers from the Rwandan ICT
Chambers and the Oxford Internet Institute over the summer of 2012. The research took place
within two wider projects and reﬂects the two disciplinary backgrounds of the authors. The
ICT Chambers is in the process of developing a methodology for measuring the impact of
ICTs on the economy of Rwanda. Elie Nzayisenga is an economist by training and the project
therefore sought to quantify the impact of ICTs on local livelihoods. Second, the Oxford Internet
Institute, in partnership with the University of Nairobi and the National University of Rwanda, is
conducting research on the impact of ﬁbre optic Internet connectivity on value chains in the tea,
tourism and ‘information-based services’ sectors in Kenya and Rwanda. Laura Mann is a sociol-
ogist and Africanist by training, and this project used more qualitative methods. Fifty interviews
were conducted with Rwandan business managers and policy-makers engaged in the ICT and
BPO sectors of the Rwandan economy (50 interviews were also conducted in Kenya). This
paper draws on some of these interviews to provide background to the wider development strat-
egy of the GoR.
Together, the two authors interviewed 27 mobile airtime sellers in 3 neighbourhoods of
Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali: Nyabugogo, Nyamirambo and Kiyovu in Kigali Town centre.
These interviews sought to uncover how the expansion of mobile telephony has affected the
lives and futures of these informal workers. These neighbourhoods were chosen due to their
different socio-economic conditions. Nyabugogo is a busy taxi and bus intersection near the
centre of the town. There are also a number of markets in the vicinity and therefore a high
level of daily trafﬁc. Nyamirambo is a low-income residential neighbourhood in the southwest
corner of the city. It is the most diverse of all Kigali neighbourhoods and houses the majority
of the city’s Muslim population. In contrast, Kiyovu is the one of the wealthiest areas of
Kigali. Stretching from Union Trade Centre (Rujugiro Building) in the centre of town to Circle
Sportif, this area includes high-end residential properties, President Kagame’s house (Urugwiro
village), Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and the ofﬁces of many international
businesses and Non-governmental organisations. The area’s informal section has recently been
the target of government efforts to clear the informal slum housing in the capital (Manirakiza
2012). Together these three areas provide an opportunity to better understand the economic
and social proﬁles of airtime sellers in different neighbourhoods of Kigali.
In all three areas, respondents were asked a series of questions, detailing their economic and
social backgrounds, their personal use of ICTs, their everyday sales activities and their plans for
28 L. Mann and E. Nzayisenga
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the future.1 The interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda out on the streets where the sellers
worked. The researchers took time to explain the purpose of the survey and to ask respondents
for informed consent. By and large, individuals were happy to take part and most gave half an
hour to an hour of their time to answer the questions. For all respondents, it was the ﬁrst time
they had been included in an economic survey. As always, there are some limitations. The
sample size is relatively small and restricted to Kigali and unlike Rollason’s (2013) long-term eth-
nographic study of motorcycle taxi drivers, our ﬁeldwork involved a one-off survey. There would
no doubt be differences between urban and rural environments and if we had conducted longer
term work. Nevertheless, this survey should be received as the ﬁrst explorative step in understand-
ing the human component of the mobile phone infrastructure and the effect that this informal
employment has had on individual livelihoods. As such, further studies are most welcome.
While informal labour has become a key resource for multinationals seeking to access African
consumers, it is up to governments like Rwanda’s to ensure that the involvement of such compa-
nies has lasting and sustainable impacts on the economic and social development of the popu-
lation. Do these workers represent the necessary but disposable appendages of ICT growth in
Africa? Or will they (and their leaders) ﬁnd new ways to re-insert themselves in future economic
conﬁgurations?
Planned markets
Rwanda has witnessed a dramatic transformation in its digital infrastructure over the past 10 years.
This change has taken place within the context of what the government of Rwanda and its devel-
opmental partners have described as stable and continuous gross domestic product growth reach-
ing 8.0% in 2012 (World Bank 2013).2 This ‘digital transformation’ is not the result of a ‘natural’
diffusion of ICTs, but rather a very purposeful and strategic attempt on the part of the GoR to
rewire the country to bring about an economic transformation (Government of Rwanda 2012a).
With its small and predominantly poor population, the country was not initially attractive to
international companies seeking new markets. To compensate, the GoR, through the party-
afﬁliated company, Tri-Star Investment, helped fund the entrance of the South African telecom-
munication company, MTN, into the country (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Kelsall 2013). In
the words of Tim Kelsall:
Tri-Star contributed to a demonstration effect and learning experience in which one of the beneﬁci-
aries was an international ﬁrm. It thereby ensured not only that Rwanda entered the world of
mobile telephony earlier than it would otherwise have done, but also that the network that was estab-
lished was at least partly owned by domestic capital. (Kelsall 2013, 129)
This use of government or party funding to attract the participation of ‘private’ investment is
common across other sectors of the economy and reﬂects the GoR’s particular brand of develop-
mentalism. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) and Kelsall (2013) have argued that the experience
of Rwanda is best understood through the concept of ‘developmental patrimonialism’, a concept
adapted from the work of Mushtaq Khan in relation to Asian development (Khan and Sundaram
2000). Khan claims that given the right conditions, rent-seeking or patrimonialism, can promote
productive, long-term development by ensuring support for economic development from strategic
partners in the private sector. In addition to the GoR’s stated commitments to macroeconomic
stability, strong investment in education and infrastructure and the creation of a ‘business friendly
environment,’ Booth and Golooba-Muthebi have shown how the GoR has identiﬁed crucial
sectors and then allowed ‘party-statals’ to accrue rents and jump-start growth in these areas.
The case of MTN mentioned above is a case in point. Thus while the GoR continually asserts
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that private enterprise and entrepreneurship are at the heart of the country’s growth, government
intervention plays a strong role.
Almost all of the country (99.79%) has now been covered by mobile telephone networks with
a subscriber base of 5,155,697 as of September 2012 (or 48.1% of the population) (RDB 2013).
By the end of 2016, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) projects this number to expand to
7,437,196. While MTN still dominates, two other companies, Tigo and Airtel have since
entered the market. A fourth company and the former parastatal, Rwandatel is currently experi-
encing ﬁnancial difﬁculties and its future is uncertain.
Internet penetration has also expanded from less than 1% in 2000 to 8% in 2012. In order to
boost Internet penetration in all parts of the country, the GoR’s RDB has laid a national ﬁbre optic
backbone and linked up the capital city through the Kigali Metropolitan Network. This active
development of ﬁbre optic by the GoR stands in contrast to Internet penetration in Kenya,
where the government has taken a much less active role and coverage is thus concentrated
around the coast and major cities. Similarly, when the RDB discovered that there was a shortage
of international bandwidth and that smaller companies (that were competitors of MTN) could not
effectively negotiate access to international connectivity, the GoR intervened once more to buy
bulk capacity from international suppliers at wholesale rates for redistribution within the
country. It has given responsibility over this Internet infrastructure and bandwidth supply to
Broadband Systems Corporation (BSC), a private company in which the GoR is a majority share-
holder. These interventions have made it possible for smaller Internet Service Providers to enter
the market, particularly in areas with lower demand and have slashed wholesale bandwidth costs
by 75% (Government of Rwanda 2012b). BSC is also establishing data centres and providing
cloud services to serve national and international clients.
The GoR was also instrumental in convincing the international payment company Visa to
choose Rwanda as its African headquarters and research base. While mobile money uptake is
still low and most poor Rwandans still use low-denomination scratch cards for airtime, those
in government and the private sector expect a mobile money transformation to take place in
the coming years. In 2011, Visa launched the Rwanda Integrated Payments Processing System,
providing a digital infrastructure for electronic payments and commerce within the country
(Crisafulli and Redmond 2012). Since then, this system has been integrated and harmonized
with wider regional payment systems such as the East African Economic Community’s
(EAEC), Common Market Protocol and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa’s (COMESA) Regional Payment and Settlement System (Maiyambere 2012; Mbabazi
2012). These integrations set the stage for Rwanda to become a regional trade and ﬁnancial
hub. Indeed, the body charged with promoting the cooperation of East African nations in the
development of ICT infrastructure, the East African Communication Organization (EACO) has
its headquarters in Kigali. Interestingly, the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA)
shares a building with EACO, signalling the close alignment of ICT policy with the GoR’s ambi-
tions to become a regional economic actor.
Within the country, Visa has also worked with the Ministry of Finance and the Association of
Microﬁnance Institutions of Rwanda (AMIR) to develop a ﬁnancial literacy campaign aimed at
small and medium businesses (Nysesigo 2013). The company also plans to launch cashless ﬁnan-
cial solutions for unbanked customers and to work with the GoR to automate and modernize its
revenue and tax collection systems. It has already launched three e-government services: Online
Tax Payment System, the e-Payment system and the single Electronic Window System (Govern-
ment of Rwanda 2012b). The major telecoms like MTN and Tigo are also developing mobile
money systems for unbanked customers.
Companies like MTN are already forecasting the rapid take-up of mobile money among their
customers, even among the poorest groups. One of MTN’s senior managers explained how the
30 L. Mann and E. Nzayisenga
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company started with scratch cards but has since introduced new payment systems as part of its
growth strategy:
Now we have a system here, to do that, buy your airtime… They [the sellers] are still in the street but
not anymore using scratch cards… It has really made some families to grow. And those scratch cards
they are making really good business and changing the life of people… The same person now we
have given them the SIM card where they can buy electronic stock... So the arrangement has
changed but to increase the customer experience, we may have [to introduce] a safe automated
system. And then the customer can use mobile money to buy airtime and... doesn’t have to pass
through the man on the street… because controlling a person on the street and controlling system
is much more [easy]… because we have the ownership, we know how to control it. (Senior
manager, Kigali, 2012).
This transition towards a digital payment infrastructure is important for the company because it
would allow the company to sell higher value added services to customers. It would also allow
the company to have better information about its customers’ spending habits and preferences
through the proliferation of ‘big data’ (transactional data produced through telecommunication
use). In the future, when mobile and Internet penetration reach saturation levels, telecommuni-
cation companies based in Africa will need to start pushing higher value services in order to
continue to grow. They may also begin to sell data about their customers to other companies.
Given the GoR’s vocal support of ‘ICT entrepreneurship’ among the youth, the spread of
mobile money is highly strategic for software developers and start-ups seeking to monetize
their applications.
Finally, such developments are useful for African governments for security, surveillance and
taxation purposes. Zambia, Kenya and Lagos city have already automated some of their taxation
operations and have markedly increased their revenues (Blair 2009; Alemika, Cheeseman, and
LeBas 2011; TCS 2013). In the summer of 2013, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)
announced that it would become mandatory for all medium and large taxpayers to ﬁle and pay
taxes electronically (Mutai 2013). KRA is also using the telecommunications network to identify
non-compliant small and medium enterprises for tax purposes. If other governments wish to auto-
mate and digitally process taxes, then mobile money penetration needs to increase.
This deeper penetration of mobile phone and data services among the population is also likely
to increase the security and surveillance capacities of states as big data are increasingly being used
by African governments for counter-terrorism and police work. In line with EAC integration,
Rwanda made it mandatory for all mobile phone subscribers to register their SIM cards in
2013 (Daily Monitor 2013) and the GoR is currently developing a motorcycle database in collab-
oration with Tigo in order to improve security and road safety (Rollason 2013). In Kenya, the tel-
ecommunications giant, Safaricom has recently won a contract to increase the intelligence and
security capacities of the state in order to deal with Al-Shabab terrorism (David 2014; Standard
2014). As the GoR faces similar threats from remnants of génocidaires, it is likely that similar
arrangements are being negotiated between government agencies and telecommunications com-
panies in Rwanda as well.
At all points, the GoR has intervened in the roll-out of all three infrastructures (mobile tele-
phony, Internet and mobile money) because it views ICTs as a strategic component of its devel-
opment vision. This vision is outlined in the national development plan, Vision 2020, which seeks
to build a knowledge-based economy and to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by
2020 (Government of Rwanda 2000, 2012b). Current government strategy for promoting ICT
development focuses on two key objectives.
First, it seeks to attract international companies like Visa, Google and SAP to set up regional
headquarters in the country and help upgrade the country’s infrastructure. Similarly, it seeks to
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provide a bridge for West African companies like Ghana’s Ecobank to penetrate East Africa. To
do this, the GoR has attempted to provide a legible and predictable framework for international
actors to enter the country. In 2000, it established the Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency in
order to bring more foreign direct investment into the country. This agency has since created a
one-stop centre for new business registration. In 2001, the GoR established the RURA and the
Rwandan Information Technology Authority (RITA)3 to regulate and promote ICT-based econ-
omic growth in the country. In the same year, it introduced a Zero-Tolerance for Corruption
Policy (Porter et al. 2013). More broadly, the GoR has worked to strengthen security and
improve the visual appearance of the country, through a heavy police presence, new paved
roads, street lighting and signs, the outlawing of plastic bags and the prohibition of any unlicensed
commercial activities on open streets. Due to these policies, the country has achieved high rank-
ings in international matrices like the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business, Transparency Inter-
national’s Corruption Index and the ITU’s ICT Development Index. The effect of the visual
transformation is also clear when one speaks to foreign business people.
Second, the GoR hopes to support young Rwandan ICT entrepreneurs. Shortly after taking
power, the GoR established Kigali Institute of Technology in an effort to boost its number of
advanced technology students. It also sends Rwandan students abroad for training in IT and
engineering. In 2010, Rwanda was reported to send an average of 300 IT and engineering stu-
dents to India per year (Onyango-Obbo 2010). Similarly, it has wooed the American university,
Carnegie Mellon to open a graduate degree programme for East Africa in Kigali. In its ﬁrst year
in 2012, the programme offered 40 places to Master’s students from across the region. By 2016,
it hopes to increase this number to 150. Outside of academia, the GoR has also helped ﬁnance
an innovation and incubation hub, k-Lab, to support innovation and entrepreneurship among
Kigali’s tech savvy youth.4 At the primary and secondary levels, it has worked with the Amer-
ican programme, One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) to deliver laptops to Rwandan school children.
It has already donated 100,000 computers and hopes to deliver another 500,000 over the next 5
years (OLPC 2013).
Through the dual approach of attracting international business and promoting local skills, the
GoR hopes that the ICT sector will help create employment and entrepreneurship opportunities
for its population. Vision 2020 sets the target of 1.4 million non-agricultural jobs by 2020 and
the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy sets the target of creating
1,000,000 non-agricultural jobs by 2012 and 2,500,000 by 2020 (Government of Rwanda
2007a). Telecommunications have certainly contributed to job creation. Tim Kelsall writes:
Today, the MTN operation is invariably one of the top two taxpayers in Rwanda. It employs 690
people directly, only two of whom are expatriates. Indirect employment, including dealerships and
security guards, is estimated at over ﬁve thousand. (Kelsall 2013, 165)
With Tigo and Airtel now in the country, these opportunities have grown further. Employment
within these multinationals exposes Rwandan workers to international systems and technologies
and allows them to forge relationships and to acquire trainings in other countries. Among the
young entrepreneurs interviewed in the Oxford study, a signiﬁcant number had worked in a
large telecom before striking out on their own.
The GoR hopes the country will beneﬁt from arrangements with multinational companies
through knowledge transfer and revenue-sharing. It has also worked directly with such companies
to roll-out e-government and other digital systems within its own borders. While ofﬁcials empha-
size that providing better and more efﬁcient public services is the main motivation driving e-gov-
ernment programmes, the GoR also sees them as a strategic way of making the country an
attractive testing ground for international companies wanting to develop and pilot solutions for
32 L. Mann and E. Nzayisenga
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the rest of Africa and the developing world. The GoR hopes that when the time comes to take
these innovations into neighbouring countries, Rwandan workers and consultants will be well
positioned. Of course, these formal opportunities are restricted to those employed under formal
contracts and certainly do not extend to those selling credit on the street.
While the GoR supports the development of ICT entrepreneurship and regularly encourages
Rwandan youth to engage, it places emphasis on the youth at the top socio-economic scale and on
professional jobs. This is a problem because the GoR is behind its schedule for creating non-agri-
cultural jobs. In 2007, for example, the GoR revealed that it was projected to create less than half
the target for 2010 (Government of Rwanda 2007a). Similarly in its 2010 Special Economic Zone
Policy document, high unemployment was identiﬁed as one of the major economic constraints
facing government plans. The report writes:
There is a shortage of non rural/agriculture formal employment opportunities in Rwanda. There are
only 7,263 formal small and medium sized enterprises (SME) constituting offering full-time jobs
to 1.4% of the working population. Growing unemployment, especially amongst Rwanda’s rapidly
growing youth population, will reduce the impact of growth on poverty. (Government of Rwanda
2010, 8)
There is therefore an urgent need to understand job creation for ordinary Rwandans who do not
come from privileged socio-economic backgrounds. How can professional jobs and business
opportunities at the top of the ICT value chain also create jobs for those beneath?
While Booth and Golooba-Mutebi’s ‘developmental patrimonial’ framework has proved
useful in understanding the institutional capacities and motivation of the state to mobilize the
country towards economic transformation, it does not tell us very much about how this model
trickles down to ordinary Rwandans and it does not capture the interplay between large-scale
investment (multinational or domestic) and local informal systems on the ground. The next
section therefore looks at economic and social position of airtime sellers to better understand
how informal workers may have beneﬁtted from economic upgrading.
Ask not what your company can do for you
On a given afternoon in Kigali, Rwanda, one can ﬁnd hundreds of mobile airtime sellers on the
corners of the major streets. Hawking their MTN, Tigo and Airtel scratch cards and wearing
colourful plastic waistcoats of yellow, blue and red, these predominantly young, male and low-
educated sellers represent the human vessels through which multinational companies travel
into the phones and pockets of African consumers (Figure 1).
The term BOP has been popularized by authors such as Prahalad (2005), Hart and London
(2005) to refer to the economic opportunities and markets of poor consumers in the developing
world. In the business school literature, BOP tends to be associated with pro-poor development,
social enterprise and poverty alleviation. BOP initiatives are often presented as a kind of ‘win–
win’ for business and poor people, with the claims that they ﬁrst provide affordable consumer
goods to the poor, and second that they usually involve poor people within their distribution net-
works. However other authors such as Dolan (2012), Elyachar (2012) and Meagher (2013) have
been more critical of these developments.
Julia Elyachar has adapted Simone’s (2004) concept of ‘people as infrastructure’ to argue that
multinationals seeking new markets have come to see the social networks of the poor as potential
distribution systems for their products and services, thereby commodifying the ‘social capital’ of
poor people into multinational chains of accumulation (Elyachar 2005). In relation to BOP in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Catherine Dolan and Kate Roll have likewise argued that BOP ‘repurposes’
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informality (i.e. unregulated and unprotected labour of the poor) transforming it from something
that was once seen as ‘drag on growth,’ into something ‘developmental’ and ‘useful’ for transna-
tional capital. They write, BOP initiatives:
create and stabilize a framing of poverty as a product of market failure and its solution as the advan-
cing of enterprise and market integration – a framing that facilitates the organization of informal econ-
omies as the objective of corporate governance and positions market engagement as commensurate
with development imperatives. (Dolan and Roll 2013, 129)
Airtime sellers ﬁt within this theoretical framework well. Multinational telecommunication com-
panies use informal labour to market and distribute airtime and thus avoid expending time and
money researching the challenging environment of sub-Saharan Africa’s consumer markets.
While these companies have been able to frame this use of informal labour as a kind of pro-
poor social enterprise, it is important to see how they have also depended on these sellers to pene-
trate ‘illegible’markets. We therefore need to understand the balance of beneﬁts between informal
workers and these companies to determine if such an arrangement should be construed as ‘social
enterprise’ or ‘pro-poor’. While the telecommunication companies are building long-term, highly
proﬁtable infrastructures for both delivering content and services and accessing potentially valu-
able data about Rwanda’s population and economy, the credit sellers are primarily gaining short-
term ﬁnancial beneﬁts and some long-term skills and expertise. This section outlines those
beneﬁts in greater detail.
MTN, Tigo and Airtel all use similar practices to manage their airtime voucher sellers. There
are no formal entry requirements or recruitment procedures. Sellers merely need to approach one
of the main ofﬁces of the companies to buy discounted airtime vouchers. There, they are given
some basic marketing paraphernalia in the form of waistcoats, street booths and sun umbrellas.
Beyond the provision of visible marketing materials, the telecommunication companies do not
regulate the activities of sellers. They work on commission, receiving no training or support
from suppliers. When a seller reaches a certain level of sales, they are able to save up and purchase
a moto, and thereby become ‘a distributor’ (provided that his/her chosen area does not already
have a distributor).
For many, selling airtime is the closest they have come to formal employment. Among the
sample surveyed, the majority had been employed in construction, informal trading or unskilled
Figure 1. Photographs of Kigali airtime sellers, taken by Elie Nzayisenga.
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farm labour before selling airtime. For example, the oldest respondent (aged 41) had lost his job in
construction and had decided to start selling airtime when he found that construction jobs had
become too rare. Others had never had a steady job. 33.33% of respondents had come to
airtime selling on their own initiative while 40.74% were helped by friends who had given
them advice and instruction to start. Most were born in rural areas and had come to Kigali to
ﬁnd better work opportunities. Only 5 were born in Kigali with a large proportion (11/27)
coming from the Southern province. The majority lived in the poorer neighbourhoods of
Kigali, often travelling substantial distances to sell vouchers in the central areas of the city.
One advantage for companies using informal networks for distribution is that they do not need
to carry out market research. They merely let the sellers use their own ‘market intelligence’ to
determine where business is most proﬁtable. Use of informal networks shifts the risks onto
those at the BOP.
The sellers are overwhelmingly young people. Their age ranges between 17 and 41 years, but
89% (24) of them are between 19 and 30 years (Figure 2).
The majority of sellers are male, with only 30% (8) female present in the sample. They come
from a relatively low-educated demographic. All had attended some level of primary school with
4 leaving before ﬁnishing, 18.5% (8) more leaving after they had completed primary school. 67%
(18) had attended some level of secondary school but only 37% (10) had ﬁnished. None had
attended university. When asked why they had dropped out of school, the overwhelming response
was because of poverty and lack of ﬁnance. While primary education has been ofﬁcially free since
2003 (and secondary education free since 2006),5 voluntary contributions, school supplies and the
costs associated with forsaken wages all make education prohibitively expensive for many young
people. And as the paper discusses later, the ﬁnancial returns of formal education for young
people operating in the informal sector are currently limited.
All surveyed respondents owned personal mobile phones. 52% (14) used two SIM cards so
that they could sell both MTN and Tigo vouchers. 63% (17) could access the Internet over
their phones. When probed deeper, 41% (11) used the Internet on a regular basis. 55% (15)
used both mobile phones and cybercafés in order to access Internet. 18.5% (5) used their
mobile phones only and 26% (7) used cybercafés only.6 The biggest barriers to Internet use
were a lack of access to computers and laptops (63%), insufﬁcient English (52%) and insufﬁcient
spare time (29%). The ﬁgures on language and spare time are particularly interesting because the
GoR’s current focus on extending Internet access is through network coverage and digital buses.7
As the GoR moves towards ‘e-government,’ it will have to address these other barriers as well.
Providing physical infrastructure is no silver bullet without wider socio-economic change.
All but one of our respondents was able to send and receive money over their mobile phone.
This number is signiﬁcantly high, given the limited use of mobile money in the general popu-
lation. At the end of 2012, only 20% of the MTN’s mobile subscriber base used mobile money
(Butera 2012). As mobile phone use was at 46% among the general population at the end of
2012, mobile money was clearly still quite rare at the time of the interviews and is still at a
Figure 2. Age range of sample.
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low rate. Airtime sellers are therefore well ahead of the adoption curve. In addition to sending and
receiving money, a high number of respondents (70.34%) were also using ofﬁcial saving schemes
either through banks, MTN mobile money or Tigo cash.8 As telecommunication companies begin
to team up with banks, microﬁnance and saving and credit cooperatives to deliver micro-credit,
those using mobile money will become more ‘visible’ and ‘predictable,’ and therefore more likely
to be eligible for credit and ﬁnancial inclusion. In Kenya, Safaricom has already started modelling
the behaviour of its mobile phone users to uncover credit worthiness and offer insurance and loan
services. Airtime sellers are therefore well positioned to beneﬁt from these kinds of programmes
and may well ﬁnd ways to integrate themselves, either formally or informally, into future credit
and insurance value chains.
On average, airtime sellers in Kigali city earn 3984 Rwandan francs (Rwf) or US$ 6 per day
(although this ﬁgure varies considerably depending on the area and seller’s initial investment).9
When compared to the average wage of Rwandans of a similar education proﬁle, this ﬁgure is
very high. For example, rural Rwandans of a similar educational background reportedly earn
as little as 200–300 Rwf a day working as ‘diggers’ or ‘farm labourers’ (Sommers 2012).10 Pros-
titutes reportedly earn 100–500 Rwf per client (Sommers 2012). Higher up in the education scale,
Rwandan schoolteachers can expect to earn 44,000 per year (until recently, 25,000 a year), or 121
Rwf per day.11 Only Kigali motorcycle drivers earn similar amounts, ranging between 1000 and
5000 Rwf per day (Rollason 2013, 16). Selling vouchers on the street therefore represents a rela-
tively afﬂuent job for low-income Rwandans (although rent and food is likely to be more expens-
ive in Kigali). It also exposes them to sales and customer service experiences and opportunities to
network with local business people.
(Figures 3–5) show earnings in different areas of the city.
The average money Nyabugogo sellers can get per day is 2126 Rwf, the highest is 3400 Rwf
and the lowest is 1400 Rwf (Figure 3).
The average money Nyamirambo sellers earn per day is 3334 Rwf, the highest is 9012 Rwf
and the lowest is 1590 Rwf. The highest earner, who pushes up the average, comes from a par-
ticular background: he had formerly lived abroad in Uganda and had started selling vouchers after
an accident caused him to stop working as a moto driver. He worked in Biryogo, a crowded and
busy part of Nyamirambo and he invested a lot of money into buying scratch cards at the start of
every day (Figure 4).
On average, sellers in Kiyyovu earn 5917 Rwf per day. Here, the highest is 15900 Rwf and the
lowest is 1588 Rwf. These ﬁgures are higher due the concentration of people in the centre of town
Figure 3. Proﬁt of Nyabugogo airtime sellers per day.
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during the day. The highest earner who takes home 15900 Rwf per day had already been pro-
moted to MTN distributor (Figure 5).
We tested whether gender or education had any effect on proﬁt and found that within the
sample there was no statistical relationship between gender or education and earnings.12 Accord-
ing to these results, sellers do not appear to increase their proﬁts based on obtaining formal edu-
cation. Other factors such as the area of operation and the amount of personal investment in
vouchers were more important. This ﬁnding is in keeping with other studies of economic oppor-
tunity and educational attainment in Rwanda. For example, a USAID project found that ‘gradu-
ates of secondary school or technical school are often just as likely to be unemployed as those
with fewer years of schooling’ (EDC 2009). In Rollason’s study of motorcycle taxi drivers, he
similarly found that there was ‘[n]o evidence… that a rider’s level of education had any effect
on income’ (2013, 20). For many of Rwanda’s citizens, it would appear that education has not
yet improved their economic prospects.
However, it is clear that the mobile phone boom in Rwanda has indeed provided opportunities
to low-income, low-educated Rwandan youths to earn a relatively decent wage. When compared
to many of the sectors where multinational companies are active in Africa, the telecommunication
sector does seem to ‘trickle down’ to lower socio-economic groups. Importantly, these airtime
sellers have been able to save money, partly as a result of their integration and familiarity with
mobile money infrastructures. However, as indicated above, this period of opportunity is tempor-
ary. As Internet access and mobile money expand, the opportunities for street sellers will dimin-
ish. It is important to ask what else these young men and women can do to retain their (modestly
Figure 4. Proﬁt of Nyamirambo airtime sellers per day.
Figure 5. Proﬁt of airtime sellers in Kiyovu per day.
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improving) socio-economic statuses. Their relatively high savings rate and higher familiarity with
ICTs and Internet use indicate that they have acquired some soft skills through their participation
in selling airtime.
Self-reliance and control
When conducting research in Rwanda, one is often struck by the determination and strong belief
of ordinary Rwandans in the government’s Vision 2020 programme. In interviews with managers
and entrepreneurs, it is striking how many align their own business plans with that of Vision 2020,
often speaking unsolicited about the president, Paul Kagame as a source of personal inspiration.
Among Rwandan business people, there is clearly a sense of pride in what has already been
accomplished and a strong sense of hope for the future. Obviously, these groups have beneﬁted
most from Rwanda’s development since 1994. One might expect that it would be more difﬁcult to
get the same perspective from less afﬂuent Rwandans. Nevertheless, the hopeful discourse of the
GoR does appear to have inﬂuenced our sample of sellers.
In interviews, respondents were asked to reﬂect on a number of statements designed to
solicit their sense of hopefulness and their expectations about future economic security. All
respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am hopeful about the future’ with all the respondents
in two areas ‘strongly agreeing’ with this statement. While it was acknowledged that permanent
work opportunities are few and far between, respondents also expressed the belief that ‘anyone
can get a job if he tries hard enough’. Respondents more strongly identiﬁed with the belief that
‘If I want to be successful in the future, I need to start my own business’ than with the state-
ment: ‘If I want to be successful in the future, I need to ﬁnd a permanent job’. Figure 6
shows responses from the three areas:
Thus, in contrast to the respondents surveyed in Sommer’s book, Stuck (2012) respondents
were largely positive about their futures. Sommer’s work concentrated on young people in
rural Rwanda and Burundi. He found that the Rwandan youths in his sample faced bleak work
prospects (partly as a result of the banning of many informal livelihoods) and limited capacities
to save and start families. Surprisingly, their prospects compared unfavourably with those in
Burundi, a country considered less economically successful. While the mobile phone credit
sellers have little job security, they are doing better than many other Rwandans and are fairly posi-
tive about their futures. Whether this is due to their residence in urban areas or whether it is due to
the particular activity of selling airtime, one cannot ascertain with certainty. However, it is clear
that working as airtime sellers has given them a sustained source of income and a source of self-
motivation.
52% of the sample was self-sufﬁcient and self-contained (they do not receive ﬁnancial assist-
ance from others nor do they support others) with a further 33% offering support to other people.
Despite being relatively self-sufﬁcient, most lived with other young people in order to save money
on rent. The majority used earnings to cover rent and food expenses, with many stating that it was
hard for them to save given the high cost of living in Kigali. One respondent also used a large
proportion of his income to pay for school fees (he was the only respondent still at school).
The others did not feel that education offered a good investment.
70.34% had ambitions to move up to the role of supervisor or distributor once they had earned
enough money. Only 11.11% did not want to move up in the system. These answers suggest that
sellers are not aware that infrastructures are likely to change in future. When pressed for alterna-
tives, many expressed the desire to continue to be sellers of other products in the future, explain-
ing that they had acquired sales experience and had accumulated savings. Of these, men aspired to
become drivers of motos and taxis and used their earnings to pay for driving school fees. Women
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respondents aspired to become sellers of clothes and fruit and used their earnings to save for
investments.
It is clear, both from their responses about the future and from their stated future plans that our
respondents view self-employment as a more realistic prospect than ﬁnding permanent employ-
ment. These sentiments reﬂect the GoR’s promotion of entrepreneurship and self-sufﬁciency. In
Figure 6. Attitudes about the future.
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1999, the GoR launched and has since heavily ﬁnanced a Private Sector Federation to help coor-
dinate private enterprises. It has also worked with many international organizations such as
Educat, Bridge2Rwanda, Isoko Foundation, Global Relief and Development Partners, Karisimbi
Partners and Digital Opportunity Trust to promote a pro-entrepreneurial mindset within the popu-
lation. This ideological project is important to the government as it fears ideologies of political
tribalism. It is for these various reasons, that Rwanda has been called a model of ‘market-led
development’ by business school scholars, despite the strong intervention of the government in
infrastructure and party-statals (Fox 2013).
However, the GoR has diverged from other African governments in terms of how that dis-
course has been translated into policies affecting poor people. While many other African govern-
ments have permitted and even encouraged street vendors and other self-employed informal
workers (Hope 2012, 85), the GoR has taken a much ﬁrmer view of informal commercial activity.
It has focused on the formalization of informal systems of economic governance, seeing formality
as the basis for scaling up the economy and providing security.
The chief way the GoR hopes to engage low-level commercial activities is through the coop-
erative model. Cooperatives are intended to further the economic development of Rwandan pro-
ducers by integrating individual producers into formal systems of regulation and connecting them
with opportunities within larger value chains (Government of Rwanda 2007b). However, Rolla-
son’s research on the motorcycle cooperatives (2013) has shown that cooperatives have not con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to poverty reduction but have improved security and control within the
sector. In contrast, motorcycle drivers saw the informal ‘boss’ system as a way to signiﬁcantly
improve their living standards. This system allowed drivers to rent or lease-hire for purchase
motorcycles on terms that are affordable to them. Similar formalized schemes organized by coop-
eratives were deemed to require unaffordable down-payments and restrictions requiring riders to
apply for loans as larger groups (23).
In many cases, economic activities that take place outside of cooperatives are forbidden and
police will ﬁne, imprison or impound the equipment of those who transgress (Rollason 2013;
Berry, forthcoming). For example, Berry has shown that female-dominated activities such as
fruit selling and domestic labour are heavily policed, as such activities are seen to undermine
the broader (visual) economic transformation of the country (forthcoming). The position of infor-
mal airtime sellers is therefore unique and reﬂects their pivotal role in the penetration of the
mobile infrastructure into local communities and social networks. Selling airtime on an informal
basis on a street corner on behalf of a large multinational company is permissible, but selling other
goods informally on the street independently of large companies is not permitted. In one case,
individuals have taken the initiative as ‘entrepreneurs’ in their own right – whereas in the
other case, they are part of the distribution strategy of a large multinational company. One
might ask which activity is closer to the entrepreneurial discourse of the GoR.
The government needs reliable Internet connectivity and a higher uptake of ICTs and mobile
money among those at the BOP if Rwanda is to become an ICT hub. For this reason, it has been
convenient to allow telecommunication companies to deploy informal labour arrangements and
the GoR has therefore made it possible. However, while telecommunication companies are ben-
eﬁtting from the long-term development of a service distribution and data accumulation system,
the street sellers are only temporary beneﬁciaries of the scheme. We might ask what kinds of econ-
omic plans can be developed to incorporate these kinds of people into the ‘knowledge-based
economy’ in the long term. What kinds of ﬁnancial support systems, training and social networks
can be provided to make their visions of the future also possible? Most importantly, any strategies
should allow them to leave behind the day-to-day bustle of street survival for long-term pro-
ductivity and security. It is these kinds of debates that this paper hopes to incite within the country.
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Conclusion: a developmental patrimonialism for whom?
The use of informal labour within formal multinational corporations is becoming more and more
common across Africa. For example, in a 2005 study of informal and formal contracts in Nairobi,
Kenya, Philippe Bocquier found that ‘most of the employees of the so-called informal sector
[were] actually informally contracted by large, medium or small-scale enterprises’ (Bocquier
2005, 17). In fact, he found that seven out of eight workers were employed by formal companies
on informal contracts. This state of affairs is becoming so inconspicuous that the international
labour organisation (ILO) has re-classiﬁed the ‘informal sector’ as the ‘informal economy’ to
account for informally contracted workers operating in the formal economy (ILO 2009).
Once a nuisance for economic planners, informal economies are now viewed as a source of
ﬂexibility and as a means of making the illegible and risky ‘black spots’ of Africa accessible
to foreign direct investment and government interventions (Elyachar 2005, 2012; Dolan 2013;
Mann 2013; Meagher 2013). The blurring of formal and informal economies of course has a
longer historical precedent, with the use of informal, temporary and often exploited labourers
on colonial schemes (Wolpe 1972; Shenton and Freund 1978; Bernal 1991; El-Battahani
2009). What is new, however, is the celebration of these practices as ‘ethical’ and ‘socially respon-
sible’ and as a means of achieving inclusive economic development at ‘the BOP’.
The pressing question is not whether the ‘BOP’ has created jobs and opportunities, but what
kinds of opportunities. The sellers discussed in this article earn relatively high wages, as com-
pared with workers in other parts of the economy. They have also been able to acquire some
limited soft skills: familiarity with ICTs, general sales experience and expertise using mobile
money systems and savings schemes. Some of them have managed to save small amounts to
invest in future activities. As mentioned above, it is also likely that these groups will ﬁnd informal
or formal ways of inserting themselves into banking, saving and insurance programmes in future.
However when it comes to the economic plans currently being envisioned and implemented by
the GoR, there is limited scope for them to be included in higher value activities or to ﬁnd employ-
ment in more formally contracted careers. Their employment has not exposed them to the kinds of
skills and training that would allow them to take advantage of the higher end possibilities cur-
rently being built behind the scenes, nor has their formal education been advantageous to them
as informal street sellers. Attempts to police ‘informal’ entrepreneurship further diminish the like-
lihood of sustainable livelihoods.
While Booth and Golooba-Mutebi focus on the developmental state from the perspective of
elite coalitions, one might push them to consider the long-term sustainability of the model. The
collaboration of the GoR with multinational companies allows it to develop the physical infra-
structure of the economy and to create export earnings, but this is a very top-down style of
growth. In spite of the discourse surrounding SME development and youth entrepreneurship,
Gathani and Stoelinga have shown that 80% of the output from Rwanda’s 47 manufacturing
and agribusiness ﬁrms comes from large groups (i.e. companies that have business interests in
more than 3 companies) (2013). As Gathani and Stoelinga write,
in the current business environment of Rwanda’s manufacturing and agribusiness sectors, smaller
ﬁrms owned by individual investors ﬁnd it difﬁcult to compete. As long as long-term ﬁnance,
skills, sourcing and transportation constraints remain binding, smaller ﬁrms in the manufacturing
sector are likely to be outperformed by ﬁrms owned by larger groups. (2013, 51)
The legitimacy of the current developmental model rests on its developmental outcomes, the
extent to which ordinary people beneﬁt from the GoR’s plans. Following calls by Elyachar
(2012), Dolan (2012) and Meagher (2013), this article therefore stresses that planners and
researchers need to think more critically about value chains at the BOP, not just in terms of
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how informal networks can be used as temporary appendages to further the reach of formal cor-
porations (Hart and London 2005; Prahalad 2005), but also how these new kinds of chains and
networks can be re-engineered to provide permanent and sustainable livelihoods to workers
and business owners at the BOP.
As the Rwandan government has shown time and time again, markets do not form naturally or
automatically; they are built and shaped through linked interactions between foreign investors,
local private companies and public bodies. When we acknowledge that markets are created, we
can begin to create more stable and inclusive markets. As Rollason (2013) has suggested, informal
economic arrangements such as the ‘boss system’ have provided real poverty reduction and social
mobility for poor Rwandans by facilitating the transfer of wealth from the relatively well-off to the
poor in processes that ﬁt with the local socio-economic needs of the population. While the GoR
has hereto committed itself to the formalization of informal economic systems and has taken steps
to stamp down on unlicensed commercial activity, it might be wiser to look more closely at these
existing arrangements and recognize their contribution to growth and poverty reduction.
The telecommunication sector and other ‘BOP’ opportunities have proved a great boon for
African economies, but it is important to ask what kinds of social and institutional changes is
emerging from this boom (Jerven 2010). Changing digital infrastructures are currently re-
wiring the economies of Africa, allowing companies to outsource internal functions to domestic
and international partners (Mann and Graham 2013) and allowing governments to better centra-
lize rent management and to potentially control low-level corruption (Blair 2009; Alemika, Chee-
seman, and LeBas 2011; Mutai 2013; TCS 2013). They are allowing international companies to
insert themselves into modernization projects, automate old companies, re-engineer out-of-date
government institutions, improve efﬁciency and create high-end, high-value jobs for some.
These systems may also allow highly educated African software developers to build new
applications and products for the mass market. Occasionally, the expansion of such infrastructure
may require a ﬂexible and unskilled labour force on hand to reach into new markets and distribute
goods to ‘black spots’, but these opportunities must be seen for what they are: moments of
capitalism that are likely to shift as companies change their needs and strategies. If e-government
and payment systems are successfully pioneered, there will be limited scope for the kinds of
informal value addition that drove the initial expansion of the mobile telephone network.
While these solutions may allow governments to reduce low levels of corruption and to centralize
rents at the top, informal (and sometimes illegal) arrangements also provide opportunities for
poorer groups.
Discourses surrounding contemporary forms of globalization and modernization tend to
phrase such change as progressive and irreversible, as forces that always move forward, expand-
ing opportunities as diffusion spreads and integration occurs (Ohmae 1995; Krugman 1996).
Similarly, proponents of BOP development suggest that inequality and poverty only occur
when there are market distortions, but this approach fails to account for instances where
markets are working well but work opportunities dry out. This paper has shown that inclusion
and development come in ﬁts and spurts, booms and busts, as production and distribution
systems unfold across a bumpy landscape and as people on the ground ﬁnd ways to insert them-
selves, formally and informally, into ofﬁcial plans.
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Notes
1. The survey was modiﬁed from a previous survey used by Laura Mann for research on employment in
Khartoum, Sudan. Advice was sought from Keith Hart in order to adapt this employment survey for
self-employed and entrepreneurial respondents.
2. These statistics were produced by the National Statistics Ofﬁce of Rwanda (NISR), quoted by World
Bank (2013).
3. RITA has since been subsumed into the ICT department of the RDB.
4. K-Lab, Carnegie Mellon and BSC are all currently in the same building, the Telecom House, along
with many small and medium ICT businesses. In 2014, the RDB hopes to start construction on a tech-
nopole city to expand Carnegie Mellon and provide space for international and national tech and BPO
companies.
5. It must be noted that while education is ofﬁcially free, students still face a number of ﬁnancial barriers.
For example, there are disparities between ofﬁcial law and lower levels of policy. In addition, in many
schools, students are expected to pay Parent Teacher Association (PTA) fees. If they are unable to con-
tribute PTA fees, students are often excluded. For more information, please see: Williams (2013).
6. Although there are no reliable statistics on frequency of Internet use by users, all indicators suggest that
these ﬁgures are very high relative to the rest of the population.
7. Digital buses are Internet-enabled buses that travel to rural areas and provide access to remote
communities.
8. For an analysis of saving within the Rwandan population as a whole, please see NISR (2012).
9. As Rollason has indicated in his study of motorcycle drivers, Rwandan respondents from low socio-
economic backgrounds have been found to under-report or exaggerate their earnings (2013). He found
that responses to questions about earnings declined as respondents gained trust in the research team.
10. Mark Sommers conducted his ﬁeldwork in 2006. Some researchers now estimate that diggers earn
500–800 Rwf per day. This number was provided Berry, a Sociology Ph.D. student from UCLA
who has conducted more recent ﬁeldwork in Rwanda. Please see Berry (forthcoming).
11. To calculate earnings per day, the annual salary was divided by 365. However, Rwandan schools cur-
rently have 32 weeks of term and another 13 days of exams. It is probable that teachers supplement this
income during holidays through secondary employment. (In2EastAfrica 2012).
12. For gender, the probability value is 0.191>5%. So at 5% of level of signiﬁcance, it can be surmised that
the gender does not inﬂuence the income earned. For primary and secondary education, the p value is
0.319>5%. At 5% level of signiﬁcance, it can be surmised that primary or secondary school does not
affect how much proﬁt phone credit sellers earn.
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